

The 3D Strategy & Action Plan for the Settlement of the Transnistrian conflict

August 2004

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Republic of Moldova (RoM) became an independent state. In spite of its efforts to withdraw completely from the political and military orbit of the USSR, the Soviet Union's 14th Army remained in the eastern districts of the emerging Republic of Moldova. The presence of the 14th Army kept tensions between the RoM and the separatists from erupting into outright violence, enforcing a shaky peace and "freezing" the conflict. As a result, the secessionist movement consolidated itself in an unrecognized quasi-state known as Transnistria. Situated on the left bank of the River Nistru, with its capital in Tiraspol, this entity took full advantage of the nostalgia of the population and their fear of the unification of Moldova with Romania. After being actively involved in the 1992 military hostilities against Moldova, the 14th Russian Army was legitimized as a peacekeeping force, against the will of the people of Moldova. Today, the Republic of Moldova's central government, based in Chisinau, is unable to control this territory, which has become a tax-haven for international arms dealers and illicit drugs traffickers.

The Transnistrian "frozen conflict", so-called because no progress has been made on resolving the conflict in the past decade, mirrors other secessionist conflicts in Georgia (Abkhazia, Adjara and South Ossetia) and Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh). There are two main sources that feed the roots of these conflicts: (1) Russia's post-cold-war ambitions to retain control over ex-republics through puppet regimes, and (2) the huge profits made from illicit drugs and human trafficking and smuggling of arms from the ex-USSR military hardware depots. The beneficiaries of such profits are the main advocates of the status quo in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While attempting to gain a camouflaged legalization of the secession, and eventually join these enclaves to the Russian Federation, the supporters of these regimes initiated a "confederation" project that would in reality dismantle sovereign countries like Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan.

The lack of progress on the fundamental issue of the security and indivisibility of the Republic of Moldova, and violations of basic human rights, contraband and money laundering in Transnistria highlight the reasons why a new strategy for the resolution of the conflict is necessary. It must incorporate a new negotiation format including a new mandate for the negotiators and democratic legitimacy and transparency in the settlement process. Resolving the Transnistrian conflict is important for the security of the EU and NATO, as Moldova now shares a border with NATO and will become the European Union's neighbor in 2007. The military and political threat posed by the separatist regime, and the massive linguistic cleansing recently initiated in the region, have grown increasingly serious because they affect stability and cooperation arrangements on the borders of the enlarged EU. Recent developments show that these policies are consistent with large-scale terrorist actions that could certainly erupt into a new civil conflict putting regional security at risk.

The price Russia and Ukraine pay to preserve Transnistria is high both in political and economic terms. Now, the Russian Federation and Ukraine have sound incentives to negotiate with the West a political solution to the Transnistrian conflict, in order to secure a privileged relationship with NATO, the EU, and, in the case of Russia, with the Group of Seven world's richest countries. The people of Russia and Ukraine have more to gain from developing economic ties with Western countries - access to their markets, membership of the WTO - than from allowing a few corrupt officials to benefit from contraband. Also, democratic changes in the separatist region through free elections would reassure Russia and Ukraine that national minorities will have a full voice in the reunified nation's future.

The objective of this strategy is the definitive settlement of the "frozen" Transnistrian conflict, and the region's reintegration into the constitutional, economic, political, social and cultural domains of the

Republic of Moldova. The **strategy** adopts a conflict resolution procedure known as the “**three D’s**”, which is based on three inseparable elements: **demilitarization, decriminalization and democratization** of the eastern districts of the RoM. Demilitarization serves as an “icebreaker” for the democratization and decriminalization of the secessionist region. It mainly involves: unconditional withdrawal of Russian Federation army and ammunition from the region; decommissioning of paramilitary guards and Transnistrian security and military forces and sequestering all weapons held by various paramilitary groups; and repatriation of mercenaries that are nationals of other countries. Under international monitoring, it will be necessary to cease any production of arms in the region; to block the access of criminal organizations and paramilitary groups to military stocks and Russian hardware; and to support the installation of strict customs controls on Ukrainian soil, on the eastern border of the Republic of Moldova.

The 3D concept enjoys broad support throughout Moldovan society. 3D provides the citizens of the Republic of Moldova on both banks of Nistru with a unique opportunity to have an honest, democratic and mature say in the future viability of their country as a sovereign whole, where constitutional and fundamental freedoms are respected and guaranteed. The success of this strategy will depend on the firm support and unequivocal engagement of western institutions, immediate neighbors and great powers, and of all states interested in ensuring a climate of regional security and stability, including through their main actors in the region: NATO, the EU, and also Russia. Its success will depend also on the political will for a settlement and for democratic reforms among politicians in Chisinau, the capital of Moldova.

The 3D Strategy suggests the strengthening of the current five-party format of “**3 plus 2**” and transforming it in a new one: “**3 plus 1 plus 3**” (Russia, Ukraine, Romania plus Moldova plus OSCE, USA and EU). The constitutional authorities of the Republic of Moldova should take the sovereign liberty of requesting the setting up a **Collective Settlement International Agreement (CSIA)**. This Agreement would confirm the commitment of the ‘3 + 1 + 3’ members to the implementation of the envisioned Plan of Settlement. Countries involved would nominate representatives to an Executive Council which would monitor the implementation of the Action Plan for the final settlement of the conflict, and post-conflict rehabilitation strategies. The new framework for conflict resolution would determine the extent to which civil police forces would be introduced in the region after or in parallel with the complete withdrawal of the military equipment and forces of the Russian Federation and replacement of the existing Russian peacekeeping forces under a UN/EU mandate. This civil police force would be a fundamental element in a new security architecture in the eastern districts.

The 3D Strategy calls for the installation of an **International Civil Provisional Administration (ICPA)** in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova. The ICPA Mandate should be issued by the UN/EU and last until the final settlement of this conflict (4 years at least). The ICPA should have an UN mandate recognized by all mediating states and the Republic of Moldova. The ICPA would ensure the full and effective functioning of civil institutions in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova, restoration of basic public services, and protection of political and social rights for all the region’s inhabitants, on the basis of a mandatory **Road Map**.

The current peace-keeping forces would be replaced by a **Civil Police Force (CPF)**, which would assist the ICPA, ensure the maintenance of peace and security, and counter any threats from the region. The CPF Task would be specifically designed to monitor the evacuation of foreign troops, maintain order in the security zone, guard and protect existing stocks of arms until their final withdrawal or destruction etc, subject to the ICPA mandate as stipulated in the Road Map.

The Administration’s (ICPA) mandate would ensure a gradual and permanent transition towards the policies and milestones associated with the democratization and decriminalization of the eastern districts, including monitoring and creating appropriate conditions for local (2006) and national elections (2009) throughout the Republic of Moldova.

Extensive devolution of political, economic and social competencies would show the commitment of the constitutional authorities in the Republic of Moldova to accommodate the specific demands, cultural

profile and national identities in the region. Tiraspol Municipality would be granted a special status equivalent to that of a 'free-city', whilst the rest of the urban and rural settlements in the region would be free to join it (on the basis of free, universal and democratic referenda) or stay separate as fully decentralized, autonomous and democratic local governments.

Setting up a Regional Office of the **Ombudsman** would also enhance the guarantees recognized by the state of Moldova for the protection of human rights in the region. The Ombudsman's Office will complement the general state policy targeted at civic inclusion of the population, regardless of linguistic, ethnic, confessional or social background, ensuring the rule of law, and respect for the social and political rights of all inhabitants of this region in a constitutional and democratic framework.

The **timeline** for implementation of the 3D strategy **covers 4 years: January 2005 – December 2008**. The **Action Plan** outlines the steps needed to settle the Transnistrian conflict through the reintegration of the eastern districts into Moldova's constitutional framework. It incorporates a synopsis of the activities to be performed by the key promoters of the strategy and the expected outcomes.

I. CONFLICT BACKGROUND:

The Transnistrian conflict has been, and still is, one of the most painful remnants of the USSR's 'poisoned' legacy. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Republic of Moldova (RoM) became an independent state. The Soviet 14th Army stayed on in the eastern region of Moldova, along the border with Ukraine, to support the secessionist movement in Moldova that later formed a 'quasi-state' Transnistria on the left bank of the River Nistru, with its capital in Tiraspol. Transnistria has enjoyed substantial political, military and economic support from Russia. . Today, the Russian Army is operating as a monopolist peacekeeping force deployed in a region which is not controlled by the constitutional authorities of the Moldovan government. The freezing of the secessionist conflict in 1992 was an imposed solution, utterly contrary to Moldova's national interests. The perpetuation of the current secessionist regime is hugely undermining the viability, stability and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova.

The Transnistrian "frozen conflict" mirrors in fact some other secessionist conflicts in the post-Soviet space, such as Georgia (Abkhazia, Adjara, South Ossetia) and Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh). There are two main sources that feed the roots of these conflicts. The first has to do with Russia's post-cold-war ambition – at the end of the 1980's and beginning of the 1990's -- to retain control over ex-republics on its western border and in the Caucasus through secessionist regimes reporting to Moscow. Russia's support for the Transnistrian secessionist regime creates a blatant conflict of interest with its role as a mediator in the current format of negotiations. The second, which has gained in importance in the last few years, is the huge profits that come from illicit drugs and human trafficking, and smuggling of arms from the ex-USSR military hardware depots and from arms manufacturers operating in these regions. Beneficiaries of such profits are the main advocates for and supporters of preserving the status quo in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Aware of the uncertainty of obtaining international recognition, these groups have embarked on a project to preserve the separatist regimes under the mask of "confederation", while attempting to gain a camouflaged legalization of the secession and eventually join the Russian Federation. Their support has encouraged secessionist elites to become increasingly aggressive in the past few years. Transnistrian separatism hinders the economic and political reforms being promoted -- with international support -- in the Republic of Moldova and significantly lessens the chances of Moldovan society following its Euro-Atlantic calling. The lack of progress on the fundamental issue of securing the integrity, inviolability and indivisibility of the Republic of Moldova, the violations of basic human rights in Transnistria, and the contraband and money-laundering highlight the reasons why a new strategy for the resolution of the conflict is necessary. Such a strategy needs to incorporate a new negotiating framework and a new mandate for negotiators, enhanced by the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the settlement process.

Resolving the Transnistrian conflict is a top issue today for the security of the new neighborhood policy of the EU, and equally for NATO, which has now reached Moldova's western borders. The new security architecture, which encompasses all of Eastern Europe, would be dramatically undermined and jeopardized by the threat of instability from the unresolved Transnistrian conflict. The military and political threats and recent linguistic cleansing in Transnistria are becoming increasingly serious because they affect security and cooperation arrangements within Eastern Europe. These in turn are an indispensable element of the strategic agendas of the EU and NATO.

The Russian Federation and Ukraine have much to gain, including political clout with NATO and the EU and, for Russia, favor with the Group of Seven world's richest countries, by considering solutions to the Transnistrian conflict endorsed by the West. Improved economic ties with western countries would provide both Russia and Ukraine with better access to western markets and the potential to become members of the World Trade Organization. Democratic changes in the separatist region through free elections would reassure Russia and Ukraine that national minorities will have a full voice in the reunified nation's future. Moldova must secure the firm and consistent support of her western partners and Eastern neighbors by promoting more and deeper democratic transformations on the right bank of Nistru, eliminating the source of the Transnistrian conflict, and addressing serious corruption problems among state officials.

II. OBJECTIVE

The main objective of this Strategy is to reach a long-lasting and durable resolution of the "frozen" conflict in Moldova, followed by full and comprehensive re-integration of the break-away region into the constitutional, economic, political, social and cultural realities of the Republic of Moldova. The strategy uses a conflict resolution methodology which first appeared in 2003 under the name of the "three D's Model of Settlement". The Model consists of three closely intertwined elements: demilitarization, decriminalization and democratization of the eastern districts of the RoM. The timeline for implementation of the "3D" strategy covers 4 years: **January 2005 – December 2008**. An Action Plan outlines the steps needed to settle the Transnistrian conflict, particularly through the elimination of all separatist sources and organized crime networks, and the reintegration of the eastern districts into the constitutional framework of the Republic of Moldova.

III. SETTLEMENT STRATEGY

3.1 General considerations

The 3D concept enjoys broad support throughout Moldovan society. In its capacity as a joint platform for the democratic pro-European opposition and current government, it commands a national consensus par excellence, regardless of the political color, linguistic differences, ethnic, religious, or social backgrounds of its supporters. The emergence of the Strategy confirms the development of conditions which display a necessary and sufficient background for the replacement of old schemes and approaches to the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict with a new Strategy and Plan of Action. Earlier visions that regarded the unsettled conflict as the outcome of a long-standing "rivalry between 2 subjects with equal rights" were responsible for the lamentable failure of most of the initiatives undertaken to date.

The 3D strategy asserts that the foundation of any mechanism aiming to resolve the conflict in Moldova must be democratic, inclusive and sustainable. The success of this Strategy will depend on the firm support and unequivocal engagement of western institutions, immediate neighbors and major world powers, and specifically of all states interested in ensuring a climate of regional security and stability, not least through their main actors in the region: NATO, the EU, and also Russia.

The West's involvement could involve participation in the new negotiating format, police missions, political pressure, economic leverage, technical assistance, travel restrictions on separatist groups and mafia structures in the region, etc. The East's (Ukraine and Russia) involvement must be consistent with their own international commitment to full recognition of the unitary, indivisible and sovereign

authority of the Republic of Moldova on its own territories, and not include the expansion or encouragement of separatist movements (thriving on light-arms trade, money laundering, trafficking of human beings, etc.). Ukraine and Russia must refrain from absorbing foreign territories or usurping powers that belong to the legitimate constitutional authorities in Moldova. Last but not least, success will depend on the political will for a settlement and for democratic reforms among politicians in Chisinau, the capital of the Republic of Moldova, which will need to intensify its commitment to the protection of minorities, human rights and European covenants to ensure the pursuit of democracy.

Due to historical links and the existence of a significant minority of Russians, the Russian Federation should be a natural supporter of a democratic, peaceful and viable Republic of Moldova. Considering its geographical location and expressed ambition to join the European Union, the many Moldovan citizens of Russian or Ukrainian ethnic background stand to gain most when Moldova becomes a unified, democratic and decentralized state, freed from any potentially divisive elements, such as: large amounts of arms and foreign troops, smuggling and aggressive bandit units.

The US, EU and OSCE must play a more active role in the resolution of this conflict and no longer regard Moldova as an “exclusive area of [Russian] geopolitical interests”. The West must move beyond “cold war” stereotypes, and give Moldova a real opportunity to consolidate itself as a truly independent and democratic European state, striving to free itself from its soviet legacy and Russia’s continued influence over its domestic and foreign policy. Ukraine and Russia, in turn, must confirm through deeds their official recognition of the unitary, indivisible and sovereign status of the Republic of Moldova over its entire national territory. Participation by Ukraine and Russia in a new format of conflict negotiation will guarantee its peaceful regulation. The 3D Strategy provides all the citizens of Moldova on both banks of Nistru with a unique opportunity to have an honest, democratic and mature say in the process of democratic consolidation of the state, where Constitutional and fundamental freedoms are fully respected and enforced.

The 3D Strategy suggests the substitution of the current five-party format of “**3 plus 2**” with a new one: “**3 plus 1 plus 3**” (Russia, Ukraine, Romania plus **Moldova** plus the OSCE, USA and EU). A shift in the paradigm for the effective regulation of separatist conflict in Moldova is required by the current deadlock in negotiations. Thus, the constitutional authorities of the Republic of Moldova should take the sovereign liberty of requesting the setting up of a **Collective Settlement International Agreement (CSIA), in a “3 plus 1 plus 3” format**. The CSIA would be open for signature to other states too, although this would not affect the functioning of the proposed format for negotiations.

If this strategy is agreed, a Supervisory Council will be set up on behalf of the participating states to monitor the Implementation of the **Road Map** and design any new policies required by the final and peaceful settlement of the conflict. The Road Map will be supervised by the Council of the CSIA, which will meet twice a year and will set out competencies and resources allocated to the International Civil Provisional Administration (ICPA) for the final settlement of the conflict. Legitimized by an UN Mandate, the ICPA will exercise overall control over the implementation of the Road Map, ensuring the gradual transition towards full and comprehensive reintegration of the Eastern Districts within the Constitutional, economic, political, social and cultural space of the Republic of Moldova, the installation of democratic and effective civil institutions, the restoration of basic public services and the protection of political and social rights for all the region’s inhabitants.

The new conflict resolution format will determine whether there is need, under a UN mandate, to replace the existing peacekeeping forces of the Russian Federation with an international **civil police force (CPF)**. Such a civil police force could be the foundation-stone of a new security architecture in the eastern districts, showing the firm commitment of the West to address jointly the security concerns of Moldova’s neighbors.

A **Crisis Management Unit** will be set up by the EU to help the International Civil Provisional Administration in Moldova. Crystallization of a vibrant civil society in the Republic of Moldova will begin with the removal from the region of elements hostile to democratization.

The creation of a **Regional Office for Human Rights Protection – OMBUDSMAN** - will complement the general state policy targeted at the civic inclusion of the population, regardless of linguistic, ethnic, confessional or social background, ensuring the rule of law and respect for the social and political rights of all inhabitants of this region in a constitutional and democratic framework.

3.2 Demilitarization of the secessionist region:

Demilitarization is essential to the success of the whole strategy. As a natural part of the three-dimensional '3D' Strategy, it might serve as the "icebreaker" for the process of democratizing and decriminalizing the eastern areas of the Republic of Moldova. Only the full demilitarization of the secessionist regime can address the serious security threats inside and around the demarcation zone. The 3D Strategy's demilitarization dimension has three parts:

- Unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops and ammunition from the region (EU, OSCE).
- Decommissioning of paramilitary guards, security and other military forces of the separatist regime; confiscation of all weapons held by various paramilitary groups currently protected by Tiraspol (OSCE, EU).
- Repatriation of mercenaries that are nationals of other countries, illegally deployed in Transnistria (Ukraine, Russia, OSCE, EU).

Western international organizations, as well as Russia and Ukraine, will employ the full range of their authority and incentives to help the Russian Federation to fulfill its international commitments (CFE Treaty and OSCE) to withdraw its troops and munitions from Moldova. The removal of Russian troops from the region must be overseen and monitored by the ICPA (**International Civil Provisional Administration**), assisted by specialized technical agencies on behalf of the UN and OSCE, who will conduct all necessary activities to finalize the complete withdrawal of ammunition, military hardware, radioactive components and military units from the region. The ICPA will assess the environmental damage caused by the long-time maintenance of the ammunition and military equipment in the region and elaborate policies to address them appropriately. The Moldovan authorities will negotiate a new framework of cooperation and assistance with NATO under PfP, which will specifically target these objectives.

The whole demilitarization of the region will take about 4 years. Withdrawal of the Russian troops, combat hardware and ammunition must be confirmed and acknowledged by credible international inspectors on behalf of the EU and NATO. The international community will ensure that the withdrawal of Russian arms, troops and ammunition from Transnistria is full and unconditioned. **A Civil Police Force (CPF)** -- under recognized international mandate (UN/EU) -- will immediately take control of all remaining supplies of military hardware and ammunition and supervise railway and cross-border traffic jointly with the customs agencies of Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. The CPF will be directly subordinated to ICPA and will consist of a number of units to be decided within the newly established negotiating format '3 + 1 + 3', in which no party will provide more than 1/3 of the total deployed civil police units. Thus, Ukraine and Russia, Romania and the United States will be invited to join the EU, OSCE and UN in their effort to assist peaceful regulation of the conflict in Moldova. The only condition is that their representatives should not have participated earlier in any military operation in support of a separatist regime (in Transnistria or elsewhere).

In the face of evidence that light arms and radioactive components have been traded openly by the authorities of the unrecognized separatist regime, efforts will be made to eliminate every facility for arms production in the region. As a matter of priority, it will be necessary to cease, suspend or block (under firm international control) the existing production facilities that are part of Transnistria's military-industrial complex. Again under international control, the access of criminal organizations, paramilitary groups and military units in the service of Transnistria to military stocks and Russian hardware will be blocked, as will the restitution of hardware and ammunition transferred over the last 12 years to Russia. The **WTO, EU and OSCE** will support the installation of strict customs controls on Ukrainian soil, on the eastern border of Moldova, with the participation of a mixed contingent of Moldovan customs officials and border troops, for a provisional term of 3 years.

The Civil Aviation Authorities of the Republic of Moldova will call for the immediate registration of the existing air facilities in the region, unless their flight licenses are to be suspended. This is particularly related to the operation of the Military Airport in Tiraspol – the uncontrolled “aerial gate” for traffickers and the Transnistrian separatist regime. The Civil Aviation Authorities of Moldova will fully employ their membership and capacity to ensure that local operators comply with their decision.

This process must gradually include the proactive and systematic collection of conventional ammunition and weaponry transferred during the military rebellion and after the 1992 Cease-fire Agreement: that is, directly from the arsenal of the former 14th army of the Russian Federation; from the existing secessionist units, paramilitary, Cossack and self-defense groups; and from other individuals who subsequently specialized in a lucrative trade in conventional unregistered arms (with Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, Georgia and Serbia). Many of these individuals, who made handsome profits from the 1992 conflict, are still in the service of the so-called “Transnistrian army” or paramilitary Cossack units, and guerilla troops assimilated by the Transnistrian security forces. Decommissioning of these military and paramilitary structures is essential to the settlement of the conflict. The decommissioning must take place under strict international control, in a transparent manner, and with the effective support of the mediators, ending in the full withdrawal of all elements hostile to a peaceful settlement and democratic development in the region.

The outright rejection, by both the Russian military authorities in Transnistria and the separatist administration, of all missions for the inspection and verification of stocks confirms their intention to scale up future transfers of weaponry to the Transnistrian secessionist regime’s military and paramilitary forces. Realities on the ground call for the identification of altogether different strategies for neutralizing the combat readiness of these forces and unregistered ammunition, setting up strict controls over the combat hardware and arms stored in the region. The 3D Strategy suggests complete dissolution of these forces under strict monitoring by the EU and NATO. **Russian consent will be guaranteed through the NATO – Russia Council.** Re-conversion of former military to civilian jobs will prevent the agglomeration of socially sensitive issues in the region. The experience of NATO and its new CEE members will be critical to this aim. Military personnel with appropriate experience and training can subsequently be integrated into special peacekeeping units (following the example of the Polish-Ukrainian brigade), in accordance with the law and Constitutional provisions, Moldova’s international obligations and existing standards within Partnership for Peace.

The demilitarization of Transnistria also requires the unconditional, mandatory withdrawal from the territory of the Republic of Moldova of citizens of neighboring states who were enrolled in Transnistria’s unconstitutional, secessionist structures after 1991-92. These individuals -- many of them Cossacks, security service personnel, or persons fraudulently residing in the state’s eastern districts -- will be declared “persona non grata” on the entire territory of Moldova. As profiteers from the secessionist regime, these mercenaries are equally hated by people on the right bank of the Nistru, and by those on the left bank, who have been terrorized and subjected to repeated acts of vandalism.

Paramilitary groups and mercenaries employed after 1992 in various services paid for by the Transnistrian regime have repeatedly participated in various local and regional conflicts. These actions range from sending reinforcements to Moscow in 1993, to participation in wars in Abkhazia, Serbia and Kosovo, and more recently support for South Ossetian forces in Georgia. A professional investigation into their former activities would certainly help the ICPA (International Civil Provisional Administration) to deal with a variety of factors and sources of insecurity in the region. A gradual but rapid transition must ensure the integration of Transnistrian military personnel and elite units of the Republic of Moldova into civilian activities through the training of peacekeeping and engineering units up to NATO standards, following the example of the mixed Polish-Ukrainian and Franco-German units.

3.3 Democratization of the secessionist region and of the Republic of Moldova as a whole:

The creation of conditions for the effective democratization of the Transnistrian region, and also of the Republic of Moldova as a whole, is the cornerstone of all efforts to settle this conflict. Without the creation of a democratic climate to ensure the functioning of democratic mechanisms for the free and

unobstructed participation of citizens in public life on both banks of the Nistru, it will be impossible to sustain peace. Enhancing local autonomy -- through techniques recognized by the Council of Europe -- is one way to transform the political profile of the conflict. The population must be assisted in ridding itself of the frustrations, stereotypes and state of fear cultivated by the separatist regime that took over in 1991 in the best Stalinist tradition. Democratization is the pillar of any further efforts to settle this conflict. The Moldovan authorities will request their Western partners to secure as much space as possible on the agenda of future joint actions for the democratization of the eastern districts -- an intrinsic condition for the legitimacy and support from all those living in the Republic of Moldova.

With a view to ensuring a peaceful transition from conflict to integration, the '3D' Strategy urges the installation in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova of an **International Civil Provisional Administration** (ICPA), with a UN mandate, led by EU representatives. The ICPA should have a mandate recognized by all the mediating states and by the Republic of Moldova; this mandate to be limited but exclusively applicable to ensure the full and effective functioning of civil institutions in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova, the restoration of basic public services, and the protection of political and social rights for all the region's inhabitants. The Administration's provisional mandate will be defined in the Road Map, and will ensure a gradual and qualitative advance towards the installation of constitutional, democratic and effective authorities in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova. To this end, the ICPA will monitor and ensure the necessary and appropriate conditions for the organization of the forthcoming local (2006) and national (2009) elections, in accordance with the provisions of the Electoral Code of the Republic of Moldova, and will develop an Action Plan (milestones) to ensure the success of the transition. The administrative transition will take about 4 years, during which the ICPA will:

- **Refugees:** Ensure the conditions necessary for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes, restitution of seized assets, regulation of disputes and restoration of credible legal and judicial structures in the area (cooperative actions of the OSCE and UN);
- **Strengthen civil society institutions.** Give ordinary citizens a clear and intelligible signal with regard to the generous and inclusive civic objectives (without discrimination) for every individual citizen as a result of the restoration of the unitary and integral constitutional domain of the Republic of Moldova throughout the eastern districts (support from bilateral agencies, DFID, SIDA);
- **Business Community:** Consolidate market economy institutions so as to help the business community understand the advantages of an open and stable economy, based on principles of legality and free competition, guaranteed by the state, according to standards accepted in the EU (EU, USAID)
- **Tolerance and pluralism:** Ensure senior citizens and ethnic/confessional groups enjoy the effective support of the international community during the transition period from an unrecognized political-military regime to a pluralist system, where individuals' social and national rights are respected;
- **Military Conversion:** Integrate former military personnel into Moldovan society, while career soldiers have the opportunity to continue their career in legal military, peacekeeping units, with the necessary respect and support of the state.

Democratization will require a gradual restoration of primary civic institutions, support for civil society, the monitoring of public debates both in Chisinau and Tiraspol on the basic social and economic services provided to the population, and the consolidation of an independent and professional judiciary and independent mass media. Democratization will allow political parties to operate freely on the whole territory of the country, including the eastern districts, where they will sow the seeds of political pluralism, competition of ideas and participatory values. But democratization is also inseparably linked with the spirit of religious tolerance and ethno-cultural diversity. This is certainly possible through the intelligent and persistent involvement of civil society.

The Republic of Moldova will intensify its policy of finalizing the reintegration of small and large businesses operating today in the eastern districts into a unified legal economic area. Citizens need to have confidence in legal remedies and constitutional guarantees. Legal and judicial systems must be

reinstated quickly to facilitate the access of all Moldovan and foreign citizens to legal, notary and other juridical instruments, protected by civilian police units under an international mandate. Next on the list of priorities is the development of a single system of modern and apolitical education in the Republic of Moldova, to include all schools and higher education establishments in Transnistria. Existing general education and secondary schools in the eastern districts must enjoy adequate "rehabilitation", with re-equipment, methodological support and training according to the existing standards of the Republic of Moldova and Council of Europe recommendations on school education. A special program will be developed with a view to implementing attractive social policies, targeting certain social groups -- individual farmers, public employees, doctors, local authorities -- support for whom is essential in the settlement process

Recognition of ownership rights and assets held by individuals and legal entities is essential to the re-constitutionalization of the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova. With the exception of assets seized illegally from refugees and internally displaced persons, the central authorities will ensure a straightforward and intelligible procedure for citizens to obtain legal rights over their assets. The unification of civil records is a key objective in the restoration of constitutional order throughout the country. In cooperation with neighboring countries (Ukraine and Romania), the Chisinau authorities will ban the crossing of these countries' national borders by persons with false documents (i.e. issued in Tiraspol) and vehicles with Transnistrian number plates and other insignia of a regime which is unrecognized by any legal authority internationally.

To become more attractive, the Republic of Moldova will require certain special facilities from the EU which it does not currently enjoy, including the free movement of Republic of Moldova citizens throughout the Schengen area; the gradual lifting, under certain conditions, of tariff and non-tariff barriers to the export of Moldovan goods to the EU Single Market; and the encouragement of full participation by western capital in the economic development of the region, once there is a modern and enabling investment climate. The government of the Republic of Moldova must fully benefit from the provisions in the European Neighborhood Policy, as well as the EU Action Plan. With EU approval, the Chisinau authorities will implement a sensitive public awareness campaign "**From Neighborhood to effective Membership of the EU**". This will reassure citizens on both banks of the Nistru that they will increasingly gain from the settlement of the conflict, while also setting positive milestones for the government..

Public awareness must be complemented by reintegration of political institutions, with the restoration of a single information area in the eastern districts as a priority. New opportunities for communication and cultural, educational and professional exchanges between existing stakeholders on both banks must be encouraged and assisted. The creation of a **Regional Ombudsman Office** for the protection of human rights in the region will complement the general state policy targeted at the civic inclusion of the population, regardless of linguistic, ethnic, confessional or social background, ensuring the rule of law and respect for social and political rights for all inhabitants of this region in a constitutional and democratic framework. At the same time, the Republic of Moldova will temporarily suspend the right to participate in the central authorities (legislative, executive and judiciary) for those persons who participated in Transnistria's top unconstitutional structures. Concurrently, the Republic of Moldova will declare persona non grata those citizens of other states who hold administrative and political office in the area currently controlled by the secessionist regime and whose actions are incompatible with the norms and principles of a state governed by law.

Apart from the external support provided by the international community, the proactive support of the local population in Transnistria will be an absolute necessity for the post-conflict rehabilitation and democratization of the region. The population has been exhausted by the strains of the 'unrecognized' status quo, and wants desperately to live in a stable and predictable environment. This would send a positive signal to external actors in the democratization and demilitarization process. A special program for the civic education of the population would be extremely useful in transforming public institutions currently under the control of the "Transnistrian" regime.

Democratization will allow all citizens on the left bank of the Nistru to participate freely in public life, to get involved directly in local self-organization and self-government, so that they feel they are **co-owners of change, and not part of the problem**. A radically different approach is necessary with regard to the top officials of the current separatist regime, who were never an “equal party” to the negotiations and can no longer be treated as such. The Republic of Moldova and the mediating countries must make sustained efforts to identify and support the emergence of new leaders, legitimated through democratic values and commitment to the unity of the people of the Republic of Moldova; and encourage and support new elite in the region.

The authorities in the Republic of Moldova will make efforts to produce **a political and economic model of development and social integration** attractive to all its citizens on both banks of the Nistru. This integration model will provide religious, ethnic or professional communities with equal opportunities to participate in public life, guarantee fundamental freedoms and free access to office in all leadership structures, except where specific movements or ideologies are qualified by a court as “totalitarian, exclusivist or separatist”, as sanctioned by the country’s civil legislation and international law.

3.4 Decriminalization of the secessionist region:

Organized crime - disguised as “political and economic normality” in the separatist regime of Transnistria - is a serious threat to the country’s democratic stability, exercise of fundamental human rights and protection of minorities. Linguistic cleansing and political repression today characterize the functioning of this separatist enclave in the very heart of the Eastern European hinterland. The illegal trafficking in arms, radioactive material and human beings and smuggling seriously affect relations between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, and the Republic of Moldova and Romania.

The sources of this trafficking are located at the very top of Transnistrian separatist administrative structures, and only the proactive involvement of the European and international communities can bring about the conditions necessary for an essential change in the nature of this conflict. The Chisinau authorities will commit appropriate efforts and resources to the eradication of illegal income sources and ways of making fraudulent profits, and to the removal of actors involved in illegal trafficking of arms, goods and human beings in Transnistria. Furthermore, Moldova will immediately announce the freezing of the foreign accounts of the separatist regime’s entities and leaders. Moldova will also request all states to carry out serious investigation into the origin of capital owned by these leaders, and into the accounts of foreign firms that have invested in the region over the past 14 years. This will be done in accordance with international law pertaining to money laundering and sub-sector strategies for the country’s reintegration by peaceful means. Under the aegis of the International Civic Provisional Administration (ICPA), all resources collected from foreign and domestic accounts, assets and other properties illegally held by the top separatist leaders will be deposited into a **Special Fund for Development of the region**. This will bring honest and long-awaited justice to the ordinary people, who are today hostages of the regime.

Legislative amendments will be introduced to deal with the disbanding of underworld groups and shadow economy clans connected with the Transnistrian regime. The specific measures included in the annexed Action Plan stipulate the proactive elimination of organized crime groups with the assistance of Interpol and its member countries, particularly Moldova, Ukraine, Russia and Romania.

Welcoming the decisiveness and legitimate nature of this approach, Russia, the EU and US must make the continuation of commercial, economic, investment and other relations with firms in the eastern districts conditional upon these firms’ being registered, and working in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Moldova.

The democratization of Moldova’s eastern districts is a key to further progress on proposals for the special status of the region, whether under the current or other formats. The ineffectiveness of negotiations held under a five-party format, along with certain mediating countries’ conflicts of interests, requires the Republic of Moldova to identify urgently consultation and interaction mechanisms to

protect its constitutional interests in the matter of reintegrating its national territory. In this respect, nothing can justify the limitation of the settlement process to its present five-party format or number of mediators.

It should be emphasized that the viability of the settlement process requires the democratic development of the whole Republic of Moldova. It would be not advisable to allow the mechanical transfer of economic and political structures or other countries' experience that are neither effective nor democratic. In the same time, overwhelming support for reforming the security structures in Moldova is an indispensable item on the agenda of democratization (civilian security, e.g. customs training, training of police, administrative capacity-building and training of judges, as well as reform of military security forces). Without a reform of the army and secret services, any progress in democratic reform in Moldova will remain illusory. Existing civil society efforts in this area must be endorsed and supported. The immediate and convincing involvement of the EU, USA and neighboring countries is critical to the effective implementation of the Strategy to its logical end.

IV. PROCEDURES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGY

4.1 Central authorities of the Republic of Moldova

4.1.1. Adoption by the **Parliament of the Republic of Moldova of a political judgment on the essence of the conflict** in the country's eastern districts, given the ECHR decision (July 2004) and the systematic blocking of negotiations by the Transnistrian separatist regime and its sponsors;

4.1.2. Development and approval by Parliament of a **conflict settlement strategy**, which will oblige the Government to coordinate its policies and decisions with the goal and instruments of the Strategy for the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict by setting up a new format for mediation and conflict resolution, granting new powers to the Ministry for Reintegration, decriminalizing and demilitarizing the eastern districts, engaging civil society and restricting illegal business, etc.

4.1.3. Reconsideration of international instruments applicable to the leaders of the secessionist regime, including **the application of UN Security Council Resolution 58/241** "on the illegal sale of any types of arms" to entities guilty of this offense in Transnistria.

4.1.4. **Reconsideration of the Moldo-Russian Agreement (April 21, 1992)** on the cessation of military actions; disavowal of the 1997 Memorandum and other documents contrary to this Strategy;

4.1.5. Official request to replace peacekeeping troops (Russian Federation) with a new formula, **civil police units operating under an internationally recognized UN mandate**: ensuring a peaceful transition to the establishment of democratic institutions, and elimination of structures hostile to peace in the region, under firm multilateral guarantees of cooperation from the EU, NATO, and USA, Ukraine, Russia and Romania;

4.1.6. Development of a comprehensive **program for the social, economic and cultural reintegration** of the population of the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova, with the official creation of a Special National Fund for these purposes, subject to public oversight by civil society and the international community;

4.1.7. **Making WTO accession by the Russian Federation and Ukraine conditional** upon the legalization of Transnistrian businesses with various forms of ownership in accordance with RoM law;

4.1.8. **Termination of all economic and commercial contracts** signed by the Transnistrian separatist regime over the past 14 years, including those with foreign firms and corporations, making any damages relating to the losses incurred by those foreign forms the exclusive responsibility of the persons who have taken upon themselves the authority to sign those contracts;

4.1.9. **Conditional recognition of privatization** carried out in the separatist region through the return to the constitutional domain of the Republic of Moldova of all businesses, under conditions of transparency, legality and loyalty to the objectives of the strategy for the settlement of the conflict.

4.1.10. Announcement of a **general amnesty for all participants in the 1992 conflict**, conditional for specific categories who have held, or currently hold, certain administrative/military positions; establishment of a deadline for leaving the territory of the Republic of Moldova for persons officially declared "persona non grata"; definition of seriousness of crime for anyone sheltering them.

4.1.11. Requesting the active and immediate involvement of western nations in **monitoring the withdrawal** of Russian troops and ammunition, as well as the decommissioning of military and paramilitary units, supported by the collection of firearms from the population.

4.1.12. **Review and development of the legislative framework in the Republic of Moldova with a view to the state's political and administrative decentralization**, e.g. through the adoption of a Law on administrative decentralization, Law on regional autonomy, Law on disadvantaged areas, Law on regional development, Law on the creation of free enterprise areas, as instruments for the conversion of political tensions into administrative conflicts; abolition of any secessionist structures and forces.

4.1.13. Moldovan Parliament to make every efforts to elaborate and adopt, in coordination with the International Civil Provisional Administration, mediators and local constituency of the Eastern districts a **Special Statute of Tiraspol Urban Conglomerate**, as a 'free-city', free economic zone.

4.1.14. Participation in the creation of a **Special Fund for the reconstruction of the region**, with finance and consultancy provided under strict coordination and auditing by the ICPA. Moldovan authorities to re-direct deposit resources and other earnings obtained from illegal privatization and ownership and illegally retained by the top leaders of the separatist regime; to be employed by the ICPA to finance infrastructure and public services modernization in the region.

4.1.15. Effective support and logistics for the **installation of the ICPA** (International Civil Provisional Administration) in one of the major cities of the eastern region (Rabnita or Dubasari).

4.2 European Union and the USA

4.2.1. Involvement in negotiations under the new "3+1+3" format and **formulation of a common position** – the **Collective Settlement International Agreement (CSIA)** - in support of the conditions necessary to ensure the stability and viability of the Republic of Moldova (rule of law, market economy, security guarantees, outlawing the support provided by certain countries to the secessionist regime, creation of funds for the support of territorial reintegration and removal of hostile structures).

4.2.2. Effective support and resources for the installation of the International Civil Provisional Administration (ICPA) for a limited transitional period, as stipulated by the Road Map;

4.2.3. **Creation and allocation by the EU of a Civil Police Force for Moldova (CPF)** with a clear mission to ensure the necessary conditions for the implementation of the Road Map, under the aegis of the new mediators (3 plus 1 plus 3), and tasks delegated to the ICPA. Recently, the EU decided to send civil police to Sudan, so it is highly legitimate that a similar operation could be provided to a 'new neighbor' which has already endorsed the first Action Plan with the EU (2004 – 2006). These civil police units should assist in installing the International Civil Provisional Administration (ICPA), in the eastern district of the Republic of Moldova, for a transitional term of about 4 years, during which democratic institutions essential for the protection of human rights and the rule of law will be restored.

4.2.3. Participation in the creation of a **Special Fund for the reconstruction of the region**, with finance and consultancy provided under strict coordination and auditing by the ICPA.

4.2.4. **Extension of the EU – RoM Action Plan** to the consolidation of state security and viability guarantees until the opportunity arises to obtain the status of EU associate member;

4.2.5. **Negotiation and coordination** of a multi-annual program of technical assistance from the EU and UN for the creation and development of civil, democratic institutions as prerequisites for the economic, political and social reintegration of Transnistrian into the constitutional domain of Moldova.

4.2.6. **Blocking commercial and financial transactions with firms in Transnistrian** that are not legally registered as businesses in the Republic of Moldova (nonconformity of certificates of origin for goods, export-import customs procedures)

4.2.7. **Imposing** repeated travel sanctions on current separatist leaders in OSCE and EU member countries, and initiating court proceedings with regard to various crimes committed by them over the past 14 years (military rebellion, promotion of inter-ethnic hatred, contraband, restricting freedom of movement, etc).

4.2.8. Increasing the **accountability of neighboring states** (Ukraine, Romania) with regard to illegal transactions by the Transnistrian regime through customs points on their soil.

4.2.9. Finalizing the process of **destruction of ammunition and withdrawal of foreign arms and troops** from the Republic of Moldova (the country's eastern districts).

4.2.10. Systematic and thorough inspection of weapons stocks in the separatist region in accordance with the CFE Treaty; and, under the new settlement format, installation of units for the monitoring and supervision of military stocks till their final withdrawal or destruction, under international control.

4.2.11. Firm and committed help to Moldova in removing the obstacles to territorial reintegration of the country must feature more prominently at the international level, i.e. in Russia-US relations, EU-Russia relations and this should be done on a regular basis.

4.2.12. As well as participating in the CSIA, as a firm international mechanism to resolve the long-standing conflict over Transnistria, the USA should help Moldova to implement a radical reform of its security structures, including reform of civilian security, e.g. customs training, training of police, administrative capacity-building and training of judges, as well as reform of military security forces.

4.3 International community (UN, OSCE, WTO, Stability Pact):

4.3.1. Replacement of the current peacekeeping forces with civil police troops under an international mandate (UN). A provisional international administration (ICPA) should be officially suggested and requested by the Republic of Moldova in its capacity of member of the UN, OSCE and CoE, as a means of solving its problems of security and protection of sovereignty on the territory it does not currently control.

4.3.2. The minimum necessary conditions for the installation of this administration are: (a) appointment of a civil administrator (by OSCE, EU) for the Transnistrian area (similar to Kosovo, Iraq), supported by a body of professionals to ensure control and effective management of civil police units under an external mandate; management of customs points on the Moldo-Ukrainian border by customs police under an external mandate; sealing and strict supervision of military stocks and arsenals in the region; effective administration of the military airport (Tiraspol); (b) appointment of an external military administrator who will control the status quo of existing military and paramilitary units, until the end of negotiations.

4.3.3. Changing the mandate of the mediating countries. Under the future format, the mediating states must effectively contribute to the full demilitarization of the eastern region (withdrawal of all military components from the region, decommissioning of military and paramilitary units, creation of a strong mechanism for interaction between police forces and the Transnistrian militia for the duration of the mandate for the activity of the ICPA-controlled civil police, to block any emergence of disguised or unregistered troops, and to put an end to illegal trade in arms and military provocation).

4.3.4. The WTO to assist in monitoring the establishment and proper functioning of joint Moldo-Ukrainian customs points on Ukrainian soil all along Moldova's eastern border, currently controlled by the Tiraspol regime, with a view to combating illegal trafficking in arms and contraband, money laundering, illegal border crossing.

4.3.5. Surveillance through Interpol of mafia chiefs, traffickers in arms and human beings, smugglers from Transnistria, and also from Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, prosecution for crimes committed, including through applications to the Hague Tribunal.

4.3.6. The donor community, EU, USA, to contribute to the **economic transformation of Moldova**, including full reconversion of the former military enterprises in Transnistria and in other regions of the Republic of Moldova, backed by a package of strategic investments, increasing industrial potential for exports and access to EU markets.

4.3.7. Participation in the creation of a **Special Fund for the reconstruction of the region**, with finance and consultancy provided under strict coordination and auditing by the ICPA.

4.4. Ukraine:

4.4.1. Acceptance of and contribution to the establishment and proper functioning of 4 joint Moldo-Ukrainian customs points across the border (between Soroca and Dnestrovsk) with the Republic of Moldova along the segment which is not controlled today by constitutional authorities of the state;

4.4.2. Design and promote trans-border projects aiming to enhance the EU transportation corridors that transverse the territories of Moldova and Ukraine, as a joint initiative under the New Neighborhood Instruments, as announced by the EU;

4.4.3. Participation in the design and functioning of the **Collective Settlement International Agreement (CSIA)**, at the invitation of the Republic of Moldova, proving thus its international commitment to and responsibility for the consolidation of peace, stability and security in the region, and later, support for the implementation of the **Road Map**, allocating specific executive and political responsibilities to the ICPA and CPF;

4.4.4. Initiating consultations with Moldova on forging a **common position towards the EU's Neighborhood Policy**, and planning joint actions to increase its contribution to border policy and anti-smuggling measures, to make the borders impenetrable to all possible threats;

4.4.5. **Dislocation of organized crime in the region** through a new framework of coordination and cooperation between the specialized bodies of both countries fighting against international crime, smuggling, and the trafficking of human beings and illicit substances, arms and other goods that are restricted by the legislation of Moldova and Ukraine;

4.4.6. Appropriate measures to set up a **joint Moldo-Ukrainian-Romanian Peace-Keeping Force** (on the same model as the Polish-Ukrainian Brigade), under an extended PfP framework;

4.4.7. Following a peaceful transition and the territorial reintegration of Moldova, **open a branch of the Ukrainian Consular Office** in one of the major cities of the region, Tiraspol or Bender, to be further agreed with the Moldovan MFA.

4.4.8. Participation of Ukrainian **firms in the process of destruction of ammunition** that cannot be transported/withdrawn from the region, at the invitation of Moldova, and in a format set up by the International Civil Provisional Administration (ICPA)

4.4.9. **Monitoring of commercial and trade relations** between Ukrainian business and Transnistrian firms, and provision of full information to the constitutional authorities of the Republic of Moldova.

1.1. Romania

4.5.1. Participation in the design and functioning of the **Collective Settlement International Agreement (CSIA)**, at the invitation of the Republic of Moldova, thus proving its international commitment to and responsibility for the consolidation of peace, stability and security in the region;

4.5.2. **Assist and develop institutional capabilities** of the Republic of Moldova to take further steps on its EU trajectory, i.e. an Association and Stabilization Agreement;

4.5.3 **Dislocation of organized crime in the region** through a new framework of coordination and cooperation between the specialized bodies of both countries fighting against international crime, smuggling, and trafficking in human beings and illicit substances, arms and other goods that are restricted under the legislation of R.Moldova and Romania;

4.5.4. Participation in the creation of a **joint peace-keeping force Romanian-Moldo-Ukrainian**, on the same model as the Polish-Ukrainian Brigade, as a direct Membership contribution to the NATO Security and Defense Dimension;

4.5.5. Following a peaceful transition and the territorial reintegration of Moldova, **open a branch of the Romanian Consular Office** in one of the major cities in the region, Tiraspol or Bender, to be further agreed with the Moldovan MFA.

4.5.6. Effective support for the implementation of the **Road Map**, including the creation and installation of the executive and political bodies responsible for the final settlement of the conflict (ICPA and CPF)

4.5.7 Participation to the creation of a **Special Fund for the reconstruction of the region**, with finance and consultancy provided under strict coordination and auditing by the ICPA.

4.5.8. **Monitoring of commercial and trade relations** between Romanian business and Transnistrian firms, and provision of full information to the constitutional authorities of the Republic of Moldova.

4.6.10. Participation by Romanian **firms in the process of destruction of ammunition** that cannot be transported/withdrawn from the region, at the invitation of Moldova, and in a format set up by the International Civilian Provisional Administration (ICPA)

4.6. Russian Federation

4.6.1. **Complete, immediate and full withdrawal** of Russian military units, ammunition and all combat vehicles and arms from the breakaway region, in accordance with the international obligations undertaken in 1999 in Istanbul;

- 4.6.2. Participation in the design and functioning of the **Collective Settlement International Agreement (CSIA)**, at the invitation of the Republic of Moldova, proving thus its international commitment to and responsibility for the consolidation of peace, stability and security in the region;
- 4.6.3. **Breaking off all official relations with the leaders of the unrecognized, separatist PMR**, as a confirmation of its full international responsibility for the implementation of the CSIA agreements through the Road Map, installation of executive and political bodies, under firm international control and supervision until the final settlement of the conflict;
- 4.6.4. **Freezing accounts hold in the Russian Federation by the secessionist leaders**, exchanging information and effective cooperation with security structures of the Republic of Moldova in finding a adequate solution for individuals with Russian citizenship serving in the military guards and various other troops controlled by the separatist PMR, so promoting peace, security and prosperity in the region;
- 4.6.5. Following a peaceful transition and the territorial reintegration of Moldova, **open a branch of the Russian Consular Office** in one of the major cities of the region, Tiraspol or Bender, to be further agreed with the Moldovan MFA.
- 4.6.6. Effective support for the implementation of the **Road Map**, including the creation and installation of the executive and political bodies responsible for the final settlement of the conflict (ICPA and CPF)
- 4.6.7. Participation in the creation of a **Special Fund for the reconstruction of the region**, with finance and consultancy provided under strict coordination and auditing by the ICPA.
- 4.6.8. **Monitoring of commercial and trade relations** between Russian business and Transnistrian firms, and provision of full information to the constitutional authorities of the Republic of Moldova.
- 4.6.9. Participation of Russian **firms in the process of destruction of ammunition** that cannot be withdrawn from the region, at the invitation of Moldova, and in a format set up by the International Civilian Provisional Administration (ICPA)

4.7 Civil Society:

- 4.7.1. Establishment of a **Coalition of NGOs** for the territorial reintegration of the Republic of Moldova; creation of a Civic Consensus Charter aimed at all stakeholders (parties, NGOs, religious groups, social and cultural initiatives, local authorities), in the form of an Action Plan aimed at the strengthening of democratic institutions in the country's eastern districts during the post-conflict transition period; increasing the involvement of Coalition members through targeted projects tackling social and economic problems, and identification of common democratic solutions in the format of popular democracy to achieve the statutory objective;
- 4.7.2. Creation and multiplication of a network of **Information and advice centers** for individual and legal entities in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova, and guaranteeing the individual safety of citizens as a priority humanitarian and political objective of the conflict settlement strategy.
- 4.7.3. **Monitoring of aggressive propaganda** of hate speech, and increasing democratic influence on public opinion as a means of normalizing the situation during the transition period towards the installation of democratic institutions in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova.
- 4.7.4. **Creation of social and public/private partnerships at local community level** in the eastern districts, increasing the positive integrating role of communities under Chisinau's jurisdiction, settling land and property disputes through arbitration and out-of-court means, mediated by the International Provisional Administration (ICPA), under an international mandate from the UN, OSCE, and other international agencies, as well as the juridical bodies of the Republic of Moldova.
- 4.7.5. Definition and implementation of a **civic education strategy** with other components of the 3D strategy by the NGO Coalition for the territorial reintegration of the country, including through socially oriented video clips, social theater, motivational billboards, media campaigns;
- 4.7.6. **Setting up democratic support groups in the region** through democratic education programs and restoring the public's trust in constitutional order and Moldova's central authorities.
- 4.7.7. **The confessional dimension:** church rapprochement and the elimination of ideological conflict within the cults registered in the eastern districts, mediation and identification of solutions with the help of metropolitan churches;
- 4.7.8. **Criminal prosecution of separatist actions** that are considered to be an "attempt to usurp state power" (legislative initiative, public debates, Ministry of Justice, public contribution of the civic Coalition for territorial reintegration).

4.7.9. Setting up a **Special Fund for the support of Social and Economic Reintegration of the eastern districts into the Republic of Moldova;**
4.7.10. **Encouragement of the establishment of a pro-European network of youth organizations in Transnistria:** sharing experience, newsletters, interest clubs, grant programs, public actions, development of the arts (theater, painting, sport, dancing, etc.).

Authors and supporters:

October 1, 2004

A Group of 26 NGO registered in the Republic of Moldova, including:

LADOM (League for the Defense of the Human Rights in Moldova)
Helsinki Committee – Moldova
Institute of Public Policy (IPP)
Lawyers for the Human Rights
Euro-Atlantic Center
Contact Center
Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDIS) ‘Viitorul’
ACCES Info
European House (Moldova)
‘Incredere’ Association
Center for the Legal Studies and Training
Association of the Free Electronic Press (APEL)
Association of Christian-Democrat Mayors and Councilors
Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Center
‘Altera Pars’ Association
Euro-Atlantic Association
Foundation for Christian Democracy
‘Rasaritul Romanesc’ Association
Christian Bessarabia Association
‘Saint George’ Farming Association
Association for Civic and Political Culture
CAPTES
Business Consulting Institute
CBS Axa
Ecological Movement of Moldova
European Forum for History and Culture
European Studies Center
Transnistrian Association Pro-Europe
Hyde Park Association

ROAD MAP

